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Chapter 16
The New Intersection on the Road to
Retirement: Public Pensions, Economics,
Perceptions, Politics, and Interest Groups
Beth Almeida, Kelly Kenneally, and David Madland

US state and local pension plans have served as the cornerstone of retirement security for generations of teachers, police officers, firefighters, and
other public servants for the last century. State and local governments
continue to offer secure pension benefits to some 20 million workers
and retirees, or 12 percent of the nation’s workforce. As a group, these
systems offer a cost-effective way to recruit, retain, and retire the workforce
needed to deliver essential public services. But despite the strengths of
the system, opposition to state and local pensions has emerged in recent
years. Legislatures in several states including Alaska, California, Colorado,
and Utah, have considered proposals that would drastically change how
public employee retirement systems function. This chapter considers the
question of how perceptions, politics, and interest groups—rather than
sound economic and policy analyses—are shaping public pensions.
We begin with an overview of how state and local pension systems ensure
retirement income adequacy for public employees and discuss how these
systems are financed. We contrast the successful model of state and local
pension systems with trends in the private sector toward increasing insecurity in retirement. We then turn to a discussion of how the public views
pensions and the factors that drive public opinion on this issue. Finally, we
examine the role that politics and ideological interest groups are playing in
state policymaking and the overall public pension debate.

Public pensions and retirement living standards
Retirement security trends in the United States are troubling. Retirement
plan coverage is declining in the private sector, personal savings are nonexistent for most households, and six in 10 Americans are at risk of being
unable to sustain their standard of living in retirement (Purcell 2007;
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008; Munnell et al. 2008b). But in the
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midst of this gloomy picture, there is a beacon of light: employees in
the public sector are generally well positioned for a secure retirement,
and state and local retirement systems stand out as a notable success
story.
Traditionally, state and local employees are very likely to have access to
at least one retirement plan at work and their primary plan is almost always
a defined benefit (DB) pension plan. Three-quarters of state and local
employees have a retirement plan, and of these, the majority, 86 percent,
were covered by a DB plan in 2004 (Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto 2007).
In a typical public sector DB plan, employees earn a benefit based on years
of service and career-end salary (usually an average of the final three years’
salary). The median benefit for Social Security-eligible public employees is
1.85 percent for each year of service. This means that after working 30
years, an employee would be eligible for a pension that would replace
55.5 percent of final earnings—an amount that, when added to Social
Security and private saving, should meet generally-recognized standards of
retirement income adequacy.1 It is important to note that about one-fourth
of state and local employees do not participate in Social Security. For these
groups, the median pension formula is higher—2.2 percent per year of
service—which provides a benefit equal to 66 percent of final earnings after
30 years (Brainard 2007).
Almost all state and local employees also have the opportunity to participate in defined contribution (DC) plans, which in the public sector
are known as 457(b) plans and/or 403(b) plans. Most states that offer a
DB plan also offer a voluntary DC plan as a supplement, but participation
rates tend to be low (GAO 2007a). For example, just 6 percent of state and
local employees participated in both a DB plan and a supplemental DC
plan in 2004 (Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto 2007). Low rates of voluntary
participation could reflect the fact that public employees typically make
substantial contributions to their DB plans, a fact which will be discussed
further in the following text.
In a DC plan, benefits in retirement will depend on various factors
including the amount contributed by employer and employee; the length
of time funds remain in the account; whether funds are withdrawn; the
amount of investment earnings; and the fees charged to the account. In
a typical DC plan, there is a high degree of employee direction. The
employee must decide how much to contribute (if at all), how to invest the
funds, and how to make changes to these factors over time. Well-designed
DC plans can be helpful supplements to DB plans, as they allow employees
to save additional funds for retirement on a tax-advantaged basis that is
in line with their own unique needs and circumstances. But DC plans
can be problematic when they serve as the primary retirement vehicle,
since workers generally fail to save enough, make poor asset allocation
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and investment decisions, cash out their accounts when they change jobs,
and are reluctant to annuitize retirement wealth accumulated, even when
doing so could enhance their well-being (Mitchell and Utkus 2004; GAO
2007b).
The state of Nebraska is a high-profile example of a public sector
employer that for more than three decades offered a DC plan as the
primary retirement plan to a large number of public employees, while
it offered other state employees a DB plan. Yet that state found that the
DC plan was not adequate to ensure that all workers would have sufficient
retirement income, so in 2003 it established a new cash-balance DB plan
for employees who otherwise would have had to rely only on the DC.
This was done after concluding: ‘We have had over 35 years to “test” this
experiment and find generally that our defined contribution plan members
retire with lower benefits than their defined benefit plan counterparts’
(House Committee on Pensions and Investments 2000: 32). These and
other research findings suggest that DB plans are a key component of a
retirement system that seeks to ensure that employees will have sufficient
assets to meet their needs in retirement (Engen, Gale, and Uccello 2005;
Munnell, Webb, and Delorme 2006).
Because of their widespread access to DB plans (and in many cases,
supplemental DC plans), most workers in state and local government have
a good chance to earn retirement benefits that allow them to maintain a
middle-class standard of living even after they stop working.2 Retirement
assets per worker in public sector retirement plans are more than two times
greater than those in private sector plans (Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto
2007). The median public sector retiree receives a benefit of $22,000 per
year. This amount, when combined with other reserves such as Social Security and/or private savings, provides middle-class teachers, public safety
workers, and other public workers with the ability to maintain their living
standards in retirement (McDonald 2008).

Public pension plans are a fiscally responsible way
to finance retirement
The financing of state and local pensions is a shared responsibility between
the employer (taxpayer) and employees. This is a key difference between
DB plans in the public sector as compared to the private sector. In the private sector, the financing of promised benefits is typically the sole responsibility of the employer. Social Security-eligible public sector employees
typically contribute 5 percent of pay to their pension plans, while nonSocial Security eligible employees contribute 8.5 percent (Brainard 2009).
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This model of cost-sharing is viewed positively by taxpayers, according to
public opinion surveys to be discussed in the following text.
State and local pension DB plans tend to be funded rather than financed
on a pay-as-you-go basis. Employer and employee contributions to these
public pension plans are pooled in a trust and invested. The earnings
on these investments help finance the benefits which eventually are paid
out (Steffen 2001). In fact, investment earnings pay for the greatest share
of benefits earned in public sector DB plans. Over the past decade,
almost three-fourths of the funds that have flowed into state and local
pension plans have been investment earnings. Only about one-fifth came
from employer (taxpayer) contributions, and the remainder came from
employee contributions (authors’ calculation based on data from US Census Bureau 1996–2006).
Because of their group nature, public sector DB plans create significant economies for taxpayers and employees. Investment decisions in
these plans are made by professionals, whose activities are overseen by
trustees or other fiduciaries. This is in contrast to most DC plans where
individuals often make poor investment decisions, where their inertia subjects their portfolios to acute imbalance, or at the other extreme, where
engagement in excessive trading results in ‘buying high and selling low’
(Mitchell and Utkus 2004; Munnell and Sunden 2004). By contrast, public
pension plan managers follow a long-term investment strategy (Weller and
Wenger 2008). By pooling assets, DB plans can drive down administrative
costs and reduce asset management and other fees (Hustead 2009). Asset
management fees average just 25 basis points for public pension plans. By
comparison, asset management fees for private 401(k) plans range from
60 to 170 basis points (Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto 2007). Because of
these two effects, professional investment management and lower fees, it
should not be surprising that professionally managed DB plans consistently
outperform individually managed DC plans. One widely-cited estimate puts
the difference in annual return at 0.8 percent (Munnell and Sunden 2004).
Over a 30-year time period, this would compound to a 25 percent difference in total return.
DB plans create additional economies for participants and plan sponsors
by pooling mortality and other risks. Mortality risk refers to the fact that an
individual does not know his ultimate life span, which makes it extremely
difficult to know exactly how much is needed to be certain that one will not
outlive those savings. In a system of individual accounts, each person must
accumulate enough saving to last for the maximum lifespan. By pooling the
mortality risks of large numbers of people, DB plans need only accumulate
assets sufficient to fund the average life expectancy. Thus, a DB plan will
require fewer assets to be accumulated than a comparable DC plan, reducing costs by 15 percent to 35 percent (Fuerst 2004).3 By combining the
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effects of professional management, lower fees, and risk pooling, actuaries
have determined that DB plans are much more efficient than DC plans and
that they provide pension benefits at a far lower cost (Fuerst 2004; Waring
and Siegel 2007). Thus, to the extent that public retirement systems are
supported (at least partially) by taxpayer funds, a DB plan design supports
the goal of fiscal responsibility (Hustead 2009).
Despite their financial advantages, state and local DB plans have attracted
attention from policymakers, researchers, the media, and others in recent
years, because average funding levels had been on the decline, and in
some cases, because of rising contribution requirements (GAO 2007a).
As we will discuss in greater detail, DB plan funding levels have become
a central focus of interest groups and others who seek to replace these
plans with DC plans. Clearly, DB plans’ funded status tends to ebb and
flow over time with the ups and downs of asset markets, interest rates,
and other macroeconomic factors. The funded status—the ratio of existing plan assets to the totality of current and future benefits—of state
and local DB plans fell in the wake of the downturn in asset markets
at the beginning of the 2000 decade, just as it did for DB plans in
the private sector and other institutional investors. Prior to the downturn, public sector plans as a group had reported being fully funded
(Brainard 2004). Of course there were exceptions to this general rule;
a Government Accountability Office (GAO 2008) study reported that
while most plans were soundly funded, ‘a few have been persistently
underfunded.’ It concluded, ‘Governments can gradually recover from
these [stock market] losses. However, the failure of some to consistently
make the annual required contributions undermines that progress and
is cause for concern . . . ’ (GAO 2008: 26). In other words, regardless of
the type of plan (DB or DC), if a plan sponsor postpones paying for
it, the bill will grow and become more expensive to pay when it finally
comes due.
For a solvent public plan sponsor, it may be neither critical nor particularly important for the DB pension to be constantly ‘fully funded.’ This
is because a DB pension has a long time horizon, since benefits earned by
participants in the plan do not have to be paid immediately. As a result,
many DB plans take the long view, especially for public DB plans because
they are backed by government entities that (unlike private corporations)
have a very low risk of insolvency. In this instance, periodic swings in the
plan’s funded status can be viewed as a normal and expected feature.
Cyclical downturns tend to be followed by improvements in asset markets,
a phenomenon that economists describe as ‘mean reversion’ (Poterba and
Summers 1988). Indeed, as asset returns have recovered and contributions increased in recent years, the average public plan’s funded status
has improved. In fiscal year 2006, for instance, the average plan was 85.8
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percent funded (Brainard 2007). The GAO reports that ‘a funded ratio of
80 percent or more is within the range that many public sector experts,
union officials, and advocates view as a healthy pension system’ (GAO
2007a: 35).

Proper funding may be harder to achieve in defined
contribution plans
Some argue that the routine swings in funding that DB plans experience create untenable volatility in contributions for plan sponsors, but
this is not necessarily the case. Disciplined funding practices and rules
that reflect the going concern nature of DB pension plans can reduce
the funding volatility of a pension plan, especially for public sector plans
(Weller and Baker 2005; Weller, Price, and Margolis 2006; Giertz and
Papke 2007). DC plan advocates also claim that because of the nature
of the employer commitment in a DC plan (the employer simply commits to making a contribution rather than promising a certain benefit),
such plans are always ‘fully funded.’ However, it is important to recognize that ‘underfunding’ can and does exist in a DC system, but it takes
a different form. That is, when individuals compare the actual level of
assets in their DC plan to what would be required to support an adequate retirement, they may find that their retirement needs are seriously
underfunded.
From this perspective, the level of underfunding in DC plans is striking.
According to the GAO, workers age 55–64 had a median account balance
of $50,000 in 2004. If this were converted into an annuity at age 65, such
an amount would provide an income of only $4,400 per year (GAO 2007b).
Moreover, the GAO identified gaps in workers’ ability to accumulate adequate retirement assets in DC plans, gaps that do not exist to the same
degree with DB plans where participation typically is mandatory. That
report concluded: ‘DC plans can provide a meaningful contribution to
retirement security for some workers but may not ensure the retirement
security of lower-income workers’ (GAO 2007b: 2).
This GAO 401(k) plan study stands in stark contrast to the agency’s
recent study of public sector DB plans, which concluded that the latter are
generally on track to being fully funded. GAO found that the projected
fiscal impact of fully funding pension obligations will be modest, so that
state and local governments will be able to meet their future commitments
with just a modicum of effort: ‘Estimated future pension costs (currently
about 9 percent of employee pay) would require an increase in annual
government contribution rates of less than a half percent’ (GAO 2007a: 2).
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To fill the gap in retirement wealth for DC plans, most researchers estimate substantially larger increases in contribution rates would be required
(VanDerhei 2006).

How the public perceives pension plans
Despite the health of public sector DB plans, legislatures in several states
including Alaska, California, Colorado, and Utah, have recently considered
whether to transition from a DB to a DC-only system. This may be because
public policy debates can be driven by perceptions, politics, and interest
groups rather than economic factors. We turn next to an evaluation of
public opinion on the merits of DB plans compared to DC plans. As we
shall show, the public’s knowledge base is low; the public is divided about
which one of the two systems is better; and judgments about the merits of
one type of plan over the other are driven largely by ideological concerns
and self-interest.
Low Knowledge Base. The US public does not know much about different types of pension plans. One survey showed that 40 percent of respondents said they have little knowledge of either 401(k) plans or DB plans
(Hart Research Associates 2006). Workers also know relatively little about
their own retirement plans (Mitchell 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier 1989;
Reynolds, Ridley, and Van Horn 2005; Lusardi 2007). Further, a substantial
minority of people will not even venture a guess as to the type of plan in
place (Reynolds, Ridley, and Van Horn 2005). Perhaps the most striking
evidence of the low level of knowledge is that only half of older workers
could correctly identify whether they had a DB, DC, or combination plan
(Gustman and Steinmeier 2004). As a result, expressed opinions about
different types of pension plans should be seen against the very low level of
information for most members of the public.
Public Opinion Divided on the Relative Merits of DB and DC. Little
research exists about the public’s preferences for DB or DC plans (Madland
2007). Available research indicates that, if forced to choose, people are
evenly split about the merits of each type of plan. For example, in two
nationally representative surveys, one found a slight preference for DBs
but the other found a slight preference for DCs. (The question wording
appears to explain the difference in the results.) A June 2005 Heldrich
Center for Workforce Development at Rutgers University survey (Reynolds,
Ridley, and Van Horn 2005) of 800 people currently in the workforce
asked whether workers would prefer to receive their retirement benefits
‘based on salary and years of service’ or based on ‘how much money is
in the account.’ A slight majority (51%) said they would prefer to receive
retirement benefits based on salary and years of service, while 37 percent
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would prefer to do so based on how much is in the account, with 11 percent
unable or unwilling to answer. A 2006 survey of 804 registered voters
conducted by Hart Research Associates (2006) asked: ‘Which is generally
the better overall kind of retirement plan for workers—a pension plan or
a 401(k)-type saving plan?’ A slight majority (52%) answered that a 401(k)
is better for workers, while 33 percent said a pension plan is better, with
15 percent unsure or unable to decide. This latter survey also asked what
type of retirement plan public employees should have. Results are similarly
divided. When asked about ‘proposed change from pensions to 401(k)s for
public employees,’ 47 percent of voters strongly or somewhat opposed the
plan, 44 percent of voters strongly or somewhat favored the proposal, and
9 percent said they were unsure.
Public Opinion Driven by Ideology and Self-Interest. Why people prefer
one type of retirement plan over another is likely guided by the same forces
that drive public opinion on a range of other economic policies: ideology
and self-interest. Public opinion research commonly (although not always)
finds that self-interest shapes how people think about economic policy
questions (Cook and Barret 1992; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Ponza et al.
1989; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). If people believe that a policy will
personally benefit them, they are more likely to support it. As a result, we
should expect that, for example, government employees would be more
likely to oppose switching public DB to DC plans. In fact, public employees
should be especially likely to support DB plans because unions and other
organizations communicate with them about the benefits of keeping such
plans in the face of policy proposals to switch to DC plans. When organizations publicize issues, they prime people to think about the personal costs
and benefits of an issue, making it more likely that people recognize their
own self-interest and take action (Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001).
Demographic factors such as age, income, and education, also help
determine whether people believe that a given policy is in their self-interest
and thus these factors also affect their policy preferences (Hasenfeld and
Rafferty 1989; Ponza et al. 1989; Cook and Barret 1992; Blekesaune and
Quadagno 2003). Ideology also is often theoretically and empirically linked
to policy preferences (Hartz 1955; Schlozman and Verba 1979; McClosky
and Zaller 1984; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989;
Cook and Barret 1992; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Madland 2007).
Americans tend not to have fully-fledged ideologies where every issue
position matches a basic principle, and they tend to be rather ambivalent
about their ideological leanings (Converse 1962; Free and Cantril 1968;
Feldman and Zaller 1992; Hochschild 1981; Madland 2007). Nevertheless,
Americans do have ideological leanings toward an individualistic, selfreliant ethic (Hartz 1955; Schlozman and Verba 1979), especially when
compared to people in other countries. For example, surveys find that
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people of other nationalities are more likely to believe the government
is responsible for providing a secure retirement, while Americans tend
to believe they are personally responsible. A recent American Association
of Retired People (AARP) poll found that half of all Americans believe
individuals are responsible for themselves in retirement, compared to fewer
than 40 percent of British and Germans, and fewer than 20 percent of
French and Italians (AARP 2005).
While Americans may be more individualistic than other nationalities,
they are not totally opposed to more collective solutions for retirement,
supporting a division of responsibility between individuals, government,
and employers for retirement savings. When asked in the 2005 Heldrich
poll (Reynolds, Ridley, and Van Horn 2005): ‘Who do you think should be
primarily responsible for helping workers prepare for retirement? Workers, employers or the government?’ some 39 percent of those surveyed
said workers, 25 percent said employers, and 18 percent said government.
Seventeen percent volunteered that all three should be responsible.
A related question in the 2006 Hart poll found similar results. The Hart
survey asked: ‘Do you personally think that being able to retire with financial security is a right that society should protect for all working people, or
a personal goal that people are responsible for achieving on their own?’
Forty seven percent of voters answered that retirement is ‘a personal goal
that people are responsible for achieving on their own,’ while 39 percent
answered that ‘being able to retire with financial security’ is a ‘right for
all working people.’ Eleven percent of people surveyed answered ‘both’—a
choice that respondents had to volunteer on their own.
Ideological leanings would also seem likely to shape people’s preferences
for DB or DC plans. People who believe that the right way to live in
retirement is to depend upon themselves rather than the government or
the employer would be predicted to prefer DC over DB plans. A quick comparison of ideology and pension plan preference supports this expectation,
and it shows that people who think individuals should be responsible for
their own retirement are about 50 percent more likely to prefer DC plans
than people whose ideology is not as individualistic.4
The expectation that ideology and self-interest influence how people
think about DC and DB plans is tested more rigorously in the three regression models presented in Table 16.1 in the following text, using data from
the Reynolds, Ridley, and Van Horn (2005) and Hart Research Associates
(2006) public opinion surveys. Both surveys were nationally representative. The explanatory variables in each model include age, sex, education,
income, union status, employment sector (public or private), the type of
retirement plan a person has, and indicators of ideology and political
party. Women appear to prefer interventions in the economy (Alvarez
and McCaffery 2003) and thus are expected to be more supportive of DB
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Table 16-1 Empirical determinants of the public’s self-reported preferences for
plan type and plan features
Model Specification 1 Model Specification 2 Model Specification 3
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Support for switching
Preference for a
Preference for
to 401(k) for public
401(k)-type savings
receiving benefits
employees
plan
based on account
balance.
(Constant)
Age
Female
Education
Income
Union member
Public employee
Have 401(k)
Have DB pension
Individualistic
ideology
Republican
party support

Coefficient
2.538
(0.243)
0.015
(0.020)
−0.259∗∗∗
(0.106)
−0.057
(0.039)
−0.024
(0.030)
0.057
(0.150)
−0.396∗∗∗
(0.125)
0.077
(0.124)
−0.018
(0.154)
0.201∗∗∗
(0.059)
−0.024
(0.036)
n=387

Coefficient
0.106
(0.540)
0.032
(0.048)
0.033
(0.245)
−0.042
(0.088)
0.039
(0.069)
−0.136
(0.324)
−0.501∗∗
(0.275)
−0.048
(0.296)
−0.926∗∗∗
(0.347)
0.226∗∗
(0.134)
0.096
(0.084)
n=341

Coefficient
0.020
(0.152)
0.004
(0.023)
−0.026
(0.052)
0.015
(0.026)
0.061∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.141∗∗
(0.072)
−0.124∗∗
(0.068)
0.131∗
(0.095)
−0.327∗∗∗
(0.103)
0.079∗
(0.053)
0.033
(0.030)
n=287

Notes: Reference category is not having a 401(k) or DB. Significance listed based on onetailed tests.
∗ significant at greater than .1
∗∗ significant at greater than .05
∗∗∗ significant at greater than .01
Sources : Authors’ analysis of data from Hart Research Associates (2005 and 2006).

pensions. For partisan identification, a concept closely interrelated with
ideology, people who identify with the Republican Party are less likely to
support economic intervention and thus would be expected to be less
supportive of DB pensions (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Cook and Barret
1992). Members of labor unions are more likely to support policies to
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ameliorate perceived flaws in the market, both because of their group
interest as well as the greater likelihood that union leadership has framed
the issue and communicated it to them (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Glasgow
2005). Finally, people’s own experience with a DB or DC plan may shape
their preferences, with people tending to support the kind of plan they
have because they are more familiar with it. The dependent variables
measure people’s preferences for DB or DC plans for themselves and
government employees, as described earlier.
The results indicate that ideology and self-interest are very strong predictors of people’s opinions about DC and DB plans. People who believe
in an individualistic ideology are much more likely to support DC plans,
while people who work in the public sector are less likely to do so. In
fact, these two variables—individualistic ideology and working in the public
sector—are the only variables that are statistically significant in all three
models. The result that ideology and self-interest drive public opinion
about retirement plans is robust and holds up in alternative specifications.
All other variables that are statistically significant in any of the models—
such as women opposing changing public employee pensions to 401(k)
plans—are in the predicted direction.
These results suggest that where voters and policymakers are predisposed
to a particular ideological viewpoint, they may be swayed as much by political considerations as economic ones when it comes to making decisions
about the ideal design of public pensions. Next, we turn to examine how
political forces have played out in recent debates about the future of public
pensions.

The role of politics and interest groups in the public
sector DB debate
Given that there does not appear to be a groundswell of public concern
about DB plans, and taking into account the public’s lukewarm impressions on retirement plan design, an obvious question arises: Why have
public sector DB plans become a political battleground in some states? One
explanation is that partisan politics may play a role. Another explanation
is that interest groups ideologically predisposed to more individualistic
approaches to retirement may have been able to generate enough political
momentum to raise the design of public sector pension plans as a public
policy issue, despite the overall sound financial footing of public pensions.
In this section, we first explore the issue of partisan views on retirement
policy. We then provide an overview of some key interest groups that
have focused on public pensions and highlight their role in recent state
initiatives to convert public sector DB plans to DC plans.
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Partisanship and Pensions. There is evidence that politics has been a
key factor in recent debates on public sector DB plans. Munnell et al.
(2008a) statistically examine the question of why some states have adopted
DC plans as a primary plan, while others have not. They find that Republican control of the governorship and the state legislature is the greatest
single predictor of whether a state made the switch to a DC plan. Other
influential factors included union presence and sizeable employee pension contributions, both of which tended to reduce the likelihood of DC
adoption. Surprisingly, other factors like lack of Social Security coverage
and the plan’s funded status did not have a statistically significant effect on
whether a plan made a switch to DC. This finding is reinforced in the case
studies presented in the following text. In Utah, California, and Alaska, the
pension systems were all more than 80 percent funded, yet proposals were
made (and in Alaska, adopted) to convert the system to a DC plan.
One explanation for these findings is that Republicans typically support DC plans because employees control the investments. DC plans are
consistent with that party’s political philosophy of individual responsibility
for retirement savings. Thus, when Republicans are in control, changes
or attempts at changing the nature of public pensions have been seen
(Munnell et al. 2008a). However, the results from our analysis of opinion research indicate a paradox; individual Republicans are no more
likely to support a switch to DC, after controlling for other factors (see
Figure 16.1).

−6.0%
Actuarial funding ratio
Annual accrual rate
Employee contribution
Teachers covered in plan

−4.0%

−2.0%

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

−0.3%
−0.4%
−0.6%
−1.2%
0.4%

No social security

5.5%
Republican control
Not statistically significant

Statistically significant

Figure 16-1 Effect of various factors on the probability of introducing a defined
contribution plan. Source: Adapted from Munnell et al. (2008a).
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Interest Groups and the Public Sector DB Debate. Another factor that
has received less attention from researchers is the role of interest groups in
advocating for changes to public pension systems. An interest group can be
defined as an organized body of individuals sharing goals and who try to
influence public policy (Berry 1989).
Throughout American history, interest groups have played a role in
American politics. During the New Deal, the role of business interest
groups was seen to influence policies that led to the formation of regulatory
agencies. More recently it has been suggested that interest groups are
growing too strong: one study showed the number of new interest groups
grew 30 percent from 1960–80 (Berry 1989). Another study found a similar
pattern, showing that 40 percent of interest groups were founded after 1960
and 25 percent after 1970 (Berry 1989). Both surveys showed that citizen
groups were likely to have formed recently and confirmed that the increase
is not a function of exaggerated rhetoric about the perils of modern interest
groups.
Today’s interest groups engage in a wide variety of activities. They may
lobby branches of government at the local, state, or federal level. They also
may seek to educate the American public or policymakers about issues,
but they typically present only their side of an issue, offering facts and
interpretations most favorable to their position. They are also active in
agenda building: that is, interest groups frequently are responsible for
bringing attention to their issue or position. These groups are consistent in
pushing government to develop policies that, while advantageous to their
own small constituency, do not benefit the broader public (Berry 1989).
In recent years, national and state-based interest groups have become
key players in challenging the continuation of public sector DB plans and
advocating a switch to DC plans. Tom Lussier, a former Massachusetts
state legislator and pension system executive director, provided insight
on the evolution of interest group involvement in public pensions. He
indicated that, prior to the 1980s, state and local pensions were not on
the radar screen of interest groups. But as public DB plans began investing
in equities and the assets began to grow significantly, the plans became
a target of interest groups active in pursuing anti-tax, free market, and
individual responsibility/savings philosophies. These philosophies often
did not take into consideration the economic benefits and efficiencies of
public pensions (Lussier 2008).
The agenda pursued by these anti-tax, free market groups is perhaps
best summed up by Grover Norquist, of the interest group Americans for
Tax Reform (ATR). He said of public sector DB plans, ‘just 115 people
control $1 trillion in these funds. We want to take that power and destroy
it’ (Dreyfuss 2001: 16). Norquist and his group view public DB pensions as a
battleground issue and they have actively planned state-by-state campaigns
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to dismantle public pension plans (Dreyfuss 2001). In recent years, likeminded groups including the American Legislative Exchange Council,
Americans for Prosperity, the Club for Growth, the Manhattan Institute,
and the Reason Foundation have sought to influence public opinion with
reports, briefing papers, opinion pieces, and model legislation advocating
DC over DB plans.
American Legislative Exchange Council. Founded in 1973, the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is a membership association for
conservative state lawmakers who share ‘a common belief in limited government, free markets, federalism, and individual liberty’ (ALEC 2008a: 5).
The organization generates research, policy papers and model legislation
covering various issues before state governments.
In 2000, ALEC published an issue paper which argued that public
employees should have access to 401(k) plans (Lathrop and Singer 2000).
The paper did not acknowledge that access to DC plans was already widespread for state and local employees. Additionally, ALEC offered model
legislation to state legislators promoting DC plans for public employees
as a replacement for DB pensions (ALEC 2008b). This model legislation
was introduced in Florida in 2000; though it was not adopted, the Florida
legislature did enact a DC option for public employees (Lathrop and Singer
2000). The sponsor of the legislation, State Representative Ken Pruitt,
was awarded ALEC’s ‘Hero of the Taxpayer’ award winner. Pruitt was also
nominated by ATR for ALEC’s legislator of the year award. An ATR press
release said that Pruitt was ‘boldly paving the way for similar reforms across
the country’ (ATR 2000).
Americans for Prosperity. Americans for Prosperity is a Washington, DC
non-profit organization that engages citizens to promote limited government and free markets on the local, state, and federal levels. The organization describes itself as working to educate citizens about economic policy
and mobilizing citizens as advocates in the public policy process (Americans
for Prosperity 2008). The organization has proposed closing down DB plans
in favor of DC plans for public employees on the grounds that the latter
are ‘fairer to employees, employers, and taxpayers—and they do not incur
unfunded liabilities’ (Poulson 2006). The organization became involved
with efforts in Colorado to change the public retirement system from DB
to DC, to be discussed in the following text in greater detail.
Americans for Tax Reform. ATR is a national non-profit lobbying organization established to oppose tax increases, founded in 1985 by Grover
Norquist. It serves as a national clearinghouse for a taxpayers’ movement
by working with approximately 800 state and county level groups. In recent
years, ATR also has been active in efforts to privatize Social Security (ATR
2008). ATR’s former chief economist Daniel Clifton has stated that the
organization fully supports moving to a system of DC plans for state and
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local employees (Clifton 2004). A 2002 ATR policy brief on pension reform
argues that states should move aggressively to transfer all state and local
employees and schoolteachers from DB to DC plans to ‘make full scale
pension liberation a reality’ (Ferrara 2002). The brief further argues that
DC plans allow workers to earn higher benefits than traditional pension
plans, save the employer administrative and funding costs, and help public
employers recruit the best workers. In practice, DC plans have pitfalls when
they are used as a primary retirement vehicle and often provide lower
returns for workers, they are typically more expensive for employers for
any given level of benefit, and they already are available as supplements
to almost all public employees who desire to participate in them, facts not
noted in ATR’s writings on public pensions. Nevertheless, ATR endorsed
DB to DC switch initiatives in California, and its reports were used to justify
a successful proposal in Alaska to switch to a DC plan (Broder 2005; Persily
2005a).
Club for Growth. Established in 1999, this organization seeks to advance
public policies that promote economic growth primarily through legislative
involvement, issue advocacy, research, training, and educational activity. Its
policy goals include cutting taxes, limiting government spending, and privatizing Social Security. The organization has a related political action committee that makes campaign contributions to candidates running for office,
specifically in Republican primaries (Club for Growth 2008). Through its
campaign-related activities, the Club for Growth actively supports Republican candidates looking to unseat moderate Republicans that the group
deems at odds with its anti-tax, limited government agenda (Dewar 2004).
The Club was a particularly determined supporter of President Bush’s
2005 campaign to overhaul Social Security by adding individual private
accounts and spent millions to lobby on its behalf (Bailey 2005). The
Club for Growth also was involved with the California pro-DC initiative,
with a former director advocating for a DB to DC switch (Broder 2005).
More recently, as part of its evaluation of candidates vying for the Republican presidential nomination, the group singled out former Massachusetts
governor Mitt Romney, praising him for ‘proposing to revolutionize the
Massachusetts state pension system by moving it from a defined benefit
system to a defined contribution system’ (Club for Growth 2007: 5).
The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association. Founded in 1978, the Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association is dedicated to the protection of Proposition
13, the California measure to cap property taxes, and the advancement
of taxpayers’ rights. This includes the ‘right to limited taxation, the right
to vote on tax increases and the right of economical, equitable and efficient use of taxpayer dollars’ (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association 2008).
This organization in 2005 indicated that it planned to put the DB to DC
issue on the California ballot through the initiative process (Associated
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Press 2005b). In 2007, the organization issued a study asserting that ‘California’s pensions are getting shakier’ (Taub 2007), while the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and the California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) disputed the findings. CalPERS
called the report ‘a highly contrived, biased study that fails to show the big
picture’ that ‘hinged on a “snapshot” view of activity artificially constrained
to a period of market downturn and the early stages of its recovery’ (Taub
2007).
The Manhattan Institute. Established in 1978, the Manhattan Institute
is a non-profit organization that aims to develop policy ideas that foster
economic choice and individual responsibility (Manhattan Institute 2008).
In a 2003 report entitled ‘Defusing the Pension Bomb: How to Curb Public
Retirement Costs in New York State,’ Manhattan senior fellow E. J. McMahon contended that greater fairness for taxpayers and better retirement
benefits for most government employees can be achieved by switching from
the current DB pension system to a DC model. McMahon justified the
DC approach in part by noting it is used by the vast majority of private
companies (McMahon 2003). However, no discussion of the adequacy of
these plans in the private sector was attempted.
A 2007 opinion piece by McMahon in the Wall Street Journal called into
question DB pensions and voiced support for 401(k)-type plans for the
public sector (McMahon 2007). A response letter to the editorial by the
presidents of organizations representing state and local retirement administrators and trustees called the piece ‘remarkably uninformed’ about public pensions. In the letter, the signatories noted that the column failed
to acknowledge that public pensions collectively are well funded, overseen by capable trustees, and subject to stringent laws, regulations, audits,
and public oversight. The letter also noted that the column ignored that
DB pension funds generate higher investment returns than 401(k) plans,
portability has been built into public pensions, and that when offered a
choice, the majority of public employees have eschewed DC plans and
elected instead to participate in the DB benefit plan (Hanes and Williams
2007).
Reason Foundation. Founded in 1968, the Reason Foundation is a nonprofit organization focused on advancing a free society by developing,
applying, and promoting libertarian principles. Reason’s Web site indicates that the Wall Street Journal says about the Reason Foundation, ‘Of
all the nation’s conservative or free-market policy groups, it may be the
most libertarian among them . . . and its ends up having the most direct
impact on the actual functioning of government’ (Reason Foundation
2008).
In June 2005, the Reason Foundation issued a report entitled, ‘The
Gathering Pension Storm: How Government Pension Plans are Breaking
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the Bank and Strategies for Reform’ (Passatino and Summers 2005).
The report characterizes pension benefits earned by public employees as
‘extravagant’ (Passatino and Summers 2005: 4), ‘exorbitant’ and ‘unsustainable’ (Passatino and Summers 2005: 5), but nowhere references data
on actual levels of public pension benefits. It highlights the experience
of a handful of examples of public plans that were experiencing significant funding challenges, then generalizes these exceptions to claim,
‘Government employee pension systems across the nation are in crisis’
(Passatino and Summers 2005: 3). In fact, at the time of the report’s
publication, public retirement systems were on average 85 percent funded
(Brainard 2005). The national association representing state retirement
administrators issued a response rebutting Reason’s analysis point by point
(Brainard 2006b). Reason’s report urged all governments to shift new
employees to 401(k)-style defined-contribution plans, remarking that in
addition to purported economic benefits of this proposal, the ‘moral benefit is that it allows employees the freedom to manage their own retirement accounts and invest their own money as they see fit’ (Passatino and
Summers 2005: 5). More recently the Foundation continues to advocate
a switch from DB to DC. In its March 2006 ‘Budget and Tax News,’ the
organization again indicated that the public pension ‘crisis’ has worsened, that taxpayers should worry, and that the problem is nationwide
(Summers 2006).
Common Themes. Although each of the interest groups described earlier
is a distinct entity, there is overlap in arguments made to support a switch
to DC plans. Appeals to the supposed benefits of individual control over
retirement decisions are frequent, as are claims that current DB plans are
overly generous. Each of these groups also tends to suggest that failing
to adopt DCs will result in dire consequences. For example, the term
‘crisis’ and the metaphor ‘time bomb’ are used frequently. Despite the fact
that many of their claims are at odds with reality, we will illustrate in the
next section that these interest groups have been surprisingly successful
at creating an audience for their proposals, though it may be limited to
those who share their free-market, individualistic ideology. This may be one
reason why interest groups have had mixed success in actually achieving
their legislative goals.

Recent attempts to convert public DB to DC plans
We now turn to an examination of recent attempts in four states to convert
traditional DB to DC plans. We will see that in each case, partisan politics
and/or interest groups have had a hand in triggering policy proposals and
driving the political debate around public pensions.
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Alaska In 2005, Alaska Republican Governor Frank Murkowski signed
legislation switching the state’s DB pension retirement systems to 401(k)type DC accounts for teachers and state employees hired after July 1, 2006
(Inklebarger 2005). The DC individual account system is the only retirement plan for public workers, as Alaska’s state and local employees do not
participate in Social Security. At the time the legislation was enacted, the
Alaska Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) provided retirement
benefits to about 53,000 workers and retirees such as police officers and
firefighters serving the state and 155 municipalities (Brainard 2006a). It
also impacted the Alaska Teachers Employee Retirement System (TRS)
which opened in 1955. In 2005, TRS included about 18,000 active and
retired teachers and other education professionals in 57 school districts
(Brainard 2006a).
The DC measure, introduced by Republican State Senator Bert Stedman, was ‘one of the most contentious in the legislature’ and one of
the main issues during a two-week special legislative session (Inkelbarger
2005). The special session debate—at a time when Republicans controlled
the legislature—was characterized as ‘a nasty fight’ over whether to end
pensions for new public employees and teachers (Cockerham 2005a: A1).
Consideration of the measure coincided with a push by the Bush administration to privatize Social Security. The White House reportedly became
engaged in the Alaska pension battle when Alaska Senate President Ben
Stevens contacted the White House to report problems securing votes to
eliminate the DB system for public employees in Alaska. According to the
Anchorage Daily News, a White House official phoned several Republican
House members ‘reminding them that President Bush’s vision of Social
Security reform is similar to the proposed overhaul of retirement benefits
for Alaska’s teachers and other public employees’ (Persily 2005b: A1). The
aide reportedly indicated that ‘if legislators support the President, and
support converting a portion of Social Security payroll contributions to
private accounts, then it makes sense they would favor a similar system
of individual investment accounts for Alaska public employees’ (Persily
2005b: A1).
The measure also was reported to have roots back to Americans for
Tax Reform. Democrats pointed out that the Senate Finance Committee’s
report on the pension legislation was ‘lifted from a policy brief’ by ATR;
both the policy brief and the Senate Finance report ‘tout the benefits
of switching public employees from traditional pension plans to individual savings accounts, similar to the president’s arguments for changing
Social Security’(Persily 2005a: B1). Of the connection, Senate Minority
Leader Johnny Ellis said he had the sense that the measure was ‘part of
a national conservative movement that is detrimental to public employees’ (Persily 2005a: B1). Senate Finance Co-Chair Lyda Green reportedly
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denied ‘a national political conspiracy,’ but also indicated that there was
nothing wrong if the committee report came from a conservative Web site
saying, ‘I’m not going to apologize for it’ (Persily 2005a: B1).
The House and Senate had separate proposals to address the retirement system at a time when Alaska’s public pension funds had prefunded some $13 billion in assets to pay for future costs. Similar to other
public retirement systems, funding levels were lower in 2005 due to the
market downturn in the early 2000s. The Anchorage Daily News reported
that Alaska had one of the best-funded retirement systems in the country, and there was ‘no good evidence that ending the pensions’ would
address current funding issues, and calls for more research on the issue
(Cockerham 2005b: A1).
According to the former Alaska Division of Retirement and Benefits
Director Melanie Millhorn, the pension shortfalls were due mainly to rising health care costs and a downturn in investments. The state Office of
Management and Budget indicates that in 2001 and 2002, the fund’s investments lost about 5 percent of their value. However, from 1999–2001, the
medical costs, which were expected to rise between 5 and 6 percent, actually
rose between 15 and 20 percent. As Milhorn said, ‘If it weren’t for rising
health care costs, the pensions would be more than fully funded’(Volz
2005).
Meanwhile Sam Trivette, president of the Retired Public Employees of
Alaska, also stated that the main cause of the shortfall was the cost of health
care, not the pension. ‘The pension component is well funded—over 100
percent,’ he said. ‘It is the health care component that has caused a drag
on the systems’ (Dillon 2005).
The Senate Finance Committee’s bill did not address the funding gap in
the retirement system, while the House State Affairs Committee proposal
called for addressing the funding shortfall in 2005. With limited time left
in the legislative session, some lawmakers indicated a preference to get
another opinion and ‘work over the summer and fall to see if there is
a better answer than a total overhaul’ (Persily 2005a: B1). Commenting
on the failure of the Senate measure to address funding, House Minority
Leader Ethan Berkowitz called the process ‘an act of political bullying and
arrogance’ (Inkelbarger 2005).
The pension debate also became ensnarled with other issues. The Senate
reportedly was refusing to approve almost a third of the proposed school
state aid as a ‘tactic to gain school districts’ support for rewriting retirement
benefits.’ The House voted unanimously to reject the Senate’s attempt
to link school funding to rewriting retirement benefits (Persily 2005a:
B1). And Governor Murkowski threatened to veto hundreds of millions
of dollars in public works projects across the state ‘unless the Legislature
eliminates pensions for new public employees’ (Cockerham and Persily
2005: A1).
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As the regular session neared conclusion, Democrats in the House proposed a compromise plan to create an optional DC contribution plan for
new hires (Volz 2005). The Governor vowed to veto any bill that did not
include the Senate’s proposal to place all new employees into a DC plan. In
the final days of the legislative session, the Senate and the House became
locked in a stalemate. The clock ran out and a special session was called
(Cockerham and Persily 2005). Eventually, the Governor and Republicancontrolled legislature secured passage of the DB to DC switch for new hires
(Inklebarger 2005).
In an opinion piece published in the Anchorage Daily News, former Alaska
attorney general John Havelock commented about legislation considered
during the special session, including pension reform. He wondered why
none of the legislative issues were discussed during the 2005 election campaign, nor included in the Governor’s State of the State address, nor part of
Murkowski’s list of priorities. Havelock concluded that the special session
‘illustrates a democratic process out of kilter’ (Havelock 2005: B4). He said
that ‘none of the bills was adopted as a result of widespread urging by
voters,’ nor were voters urging candidates to reduce retirement benefits
for new state employees (Havelock 2005: B4).
Despite enactment of the legislation, the final chapter on Alaska is yet to
be written. Because the plan was adopted rapidly and in a single session,
important technical questions remain open. More specifically, the law creating the individual account system may not be in compliance with Federal
Internal Revenue Service regulations, which would mean new employee
plans could lose their tax-deferred status. Additionally, the 2008 legislature
is holding hearings on Senate Bill 183, which seeks to reverse the retirement plan legislation passed in 2005 (Burke 2008). The legislature moved
toward a return to the DB plan when a Senate committee approved in
March 2008 ‘a bill to reopen a DB plan to new teachers and government
employees, and jettison a fledgling DC plan some say is harming the state’s
ability to attract and keep employees’ (Kvasager 2008). Regarding passage
of the measure State Senator Kim Elton said, ‘We took a significant step
backwards when we moved to a 401(k). It’s coming home that we have a
real problem with defined contribution. It’s probably best synthesized in
recruitment and retention. We’re finding it far more difficult to recruit
when almost every other public jurisdiction is offering a defined benefit
plan’ (Kvasager 2008).
California. In his State of the State address on January 5, 2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called for an overhaul of the state
pension system. The Republican Governor told the Democrat-controlled
legislature that the pension system was ‘out of control’ and ‘threatening our
state.’ He called for reform that would move new employees from a DB to
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a DC system that would be ‘fair to employees and to taxpayers’ (Associated
Press 2005a), a proposal would affect both the CalPERS and the CalSTRS.
Later that month, The New York Times reported that the impetus for
Mr. Schwarzenegger’s plan was generated by the ‘same anti-tax advocates,
free-market enthusiasts and Wall Street interests pushing President Bush’s
Social Security initiative.’ The proposal was ‘supported by a number of
Republican state lawmakers and is driven by the same ideology behind the
effort to transform Social Security’ (Broder 2005: 16). The Times predicted
that outcome in California ‘will not only have an impact on the state pension system, but will also provide an important marker of public opinion on
proposed changes to Social Security’ (Broder 2005: 16).
The initiative was endorsed by Americans for Tax Reform (ATR 2005;
Broder 2005). Also supporting the Governor’s proposal was Republican Assemblyman Keith Richman, who drafted legislation and filed the
proposal as a ballot initiative. The Governor’s staff indicated that he
would campaign for the Richman ballot measure if the legislature failed
to act (Wasserman 2005a). Also involved in the policy formulation was
Stephen Moore, the former director of the conservative Club for Growth
and who also was president of the Free Enterprise Fund, an organization dedicated to remaking Social Security. Moore said that the proposal ‘aims toward giving people real ownership and a real stake in
how the economy and the stock market perform’ (Broder 2005: 16).
Moore also reportedly saw the importance of California in impacting
the national agenda, commenting that should the state move from a
DB to a 401(k)-type DC system, ‘the nation is likely to follow’ (Broder
2005: 16). Several years later, Moore called for an effort to ‘abolish these
anachronistic guaranteed defined benefit pension systems and convert
public employees to portable and cost-constrained 401(k)-type pensions’
(Moore 2008).
At the time of the proposal, CalPERS was the largest pension system in
the country with some $180 billion in assets for about 1.4 million workers
and retirees. CalSTRS was the third largest system with about $125 billion
in assets for some 750,000 members (Wasserman 2005a). Although the
Governor described the plans as ‘a looming train wreck,’ The New York Times
reported that ‘even advocates of privatization in his own administration say
the system is currently sound’ (Broder 2005: 16). Together, the plans are
‘nearly 90 percent funded, a level that most experts consider quite healthy’
(Broder 2005: 16).
Opponents of the plan—which included almost all Democrats in the
legislature, state employee unions, and plan trustees—said that the plans
had been well-managed and provided critical retirement income for public
workers. DB supporters also indicated that the state contribution to the
system in 2005 was higher because of a downturn in the market. The state
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historically had benefited from a strong stock market and ‘in some years
has had to make no payments into the funds’ (Broder 2005: 16).
The backdrop for the debate was quite complex. The Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Association was involved, proposing a ballot through the initiative process. Additionally, State Treasurer Phil Angelides—a Democrat and
board member of both CalPERS and CalSTRS—formed a national coalition of state treasurers and pension fund officials to fight the governor’s
idea. He called the measure ‘a major assault on the movement to reform
corporate America following a wave of scandals.’ Angelides said that the
Governor’s plan ‘is part of a concerted effort to break apart the powerful
voices of public pension funds that have stood up for ordinary investors
in corporate boardrooms’ (Wasserman 2005b). Interestingly, a loyalist of
President Bush broke ranks and asked the Governor for an alternative to
the DC switch. Gerald Parsky, chair of the University of California Board
of Regents and chair of President Bush’s 2000 and 2004 state election
campaigns, said the measure would undercut recruiting and the economy.
Parsky said, ‘California’s economic competitiveness will suffer if we cannot retain the nation’s best and brightest faculty’ and in today’s global
economy, ‘California’s intellectual capital is our state’s chief competitive
advantage’ (LaMar 2005).
By April 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger abandoned his plan to convert
the system primarily because public employees successfully leveraged the
fact that the DC plan would not provide suitable death and disability coverage to workers, virtually killing the issue (Wasserman 2005c ). In 2006,
the Governor established a Public Employee Post-Employment Benefits
Commission to propose ways to address growing pension and retiree health
care obligations. The Commission was chaired by Republican DB supporter
Gerald Parsky. The Commission issued a report in July 2007 that found that
the total statewide pension system was 89 percent funded, and that since
2004, CalPERS and CalSTRS experienced annual returns in the double
digits which are significantly higher than their assumed rates of return
(LaMar 2005; Post-Employment Benefits Commission 2007).
Colorado. In 2006, the Colorado Public Employee Retirement Association (PERA) found itself facing proposals to convert its DB pension system
to a DC system. The Rocky Mountain News called the 2006 legislative session
‘the most challenging in PERA’s 75-year history’ (Milstead 2006b: 6B).
At the time, the governorship was held by Republican Bill Owen, who
supported drastic changes to the pension system and a switch to DC plans
(Paulson 2006a). The legislature was controlled by Democrats.
As a matter of background, the retirement system was established in
1931 by the state legislature. PERA initially provided retirement benefits to
state employees only, and then was called the State Employees’ Retirement
Association (SERA). By the end of its first 10 years, SERA had some 4,000
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members, 112 retirees, and about $1 million in assets. For the first 20 years,
investments were limited to US government bonds, or state, school, or
municipal bonds. The rates of return averaged 2.75 percent (PERA 2008).
Today, PERA is a substitute for Social Security for most public employees,
and provides retirement and other benefits to nearly 280,000 active and
retired employees of more than 400 government agencies and public entities in the state. The system has expanded its range of investments with
assets in domestic and international stocks, corporate, government, and
international bonds, real estate, and alternative investments (PERA 2008).
The editorial page of the Denver Post reported that while PERA was more
than 100 percent funded in 2000, the stock market decline that same year
left PERA funded at about 73 percent in 2006. This funding level, opined
the paper, does not ‘add up to a crisis’ (Ewegen 2006a: E1). According
to PERA, the funded status at the end of 2006 was 74 percent with a
15.7 percent return on investment and $38.8 billion assets. PERA’s actuary
indicated that this funding level is sufficient to pay benefits through the
projected actuarial period of 30 years (PERA 2008).
In 2006, there were three major PERA legislative proposals. The first was
proposed by House Republican Minority Leader Joe Stengel, which called
for placing new public employees in a DC plan. The chief supporter of
Stengel’s bill was Fix PERA, an offshoot of the Americans for Prosperity
Foundation. PERA’s executive director testified that the measure was a
‘gross overreaction.’ A House Committee voted to postpone the bill indefinitely, which essentially defeated the measure (Milstead 2006a: 5B).
The failure of the Stengel bill left two major bills. Senate Bill 174 was
sponsored by Democratic Senator Paula Sandoval and reflected PERA’s
proposal to maintain the DB system while taking steps to return the system
to solid footing by restoring and accelerating the percentage contributed
by employees to a previously higher level. Senate Bill 162 was led by
Republican Senator David Owen and supported by Governor Owens. This
legislation would have left current employees in the DB system and placed
future employees in a DC plan (Paulson 2006b). With control of the state
government split between a Republican governor and a Democraticallycontrolled legislature, a compromise solution was reached days before
the legislative session concluded. The measure approved by the General
Assembly maintained the DB pension system for all employees while restoring the funding level. The Denver Post reported that under the compromise legislation ‘every new dollar the plan puts in PERA will come from
employees, not taxpayers, mostly because employees agreed to contribute
an additional 0.5 percent of their salaries into the fund for each of the next
six years’ (Ewegen 2006b: E1). This increase parallels a similar increase in
employer contributions previously enacted in 2004. The proposal modified
the structure of the PERA Board and also allowed newly-hired employees in
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higher education to choose either a DC or the DB plan (this provision later
was modified to apply only to new employees of the community college
system). Democratic Senator Sandoval sponsored the final compromise,
which also raised the minimum retirement age for new employees from
50 to 55 (Ewegen 2006b).
Also of note was the fact that Fix PERA launched a related ballot initiative
campaign. MSNBC reported that the ‘libertarian leaning’ proposal would
have declared an ‘actuarial emergency’ and replaced the pension with a
DC plan. Americans for Prosperity Foundation ‘reluctantly withdrew the
ballot measure’ once compromise legislation was enacted and said in a
press release that taxpayers are looking at ‘an eventually bankrupt system’
(Wolk 2006; Americans for Prosperity 2006).
Utah. In 2007, the Utah state legislature began consideration of a measure to convert the Utah Retirement Systems’ (URS) DB plan to a DC
system. Such a proposal would have affected 170,000 public employees and
retirees, their families, and future workers (URS 2007). It was reported to
be one of the ‘thorniest issues of the Legislature’ (Fahys 2007a). At the
time, the data available showed the funding level to be at 96.5 percent
(URS 2007). The measure was sponsored by Republican Representative
John Dougall. He said that his bill would offer a choice ‘to employees
eager for incentives in a highly competitive job area’ (Fahys 2007b). At a
committee hearing on the bill, Dougall called the initiative ‘an idea whose
time has come’ and an option that employees insist upon having. The
lawmaker called it an employee benefit ‘that when denied, would drive
them to private-sector jobs where they can test their investment mettle’
(Fahys 2007a).
In Utah, DB plans began for public employees in 1919 with the creation
of the Fireman’s Pension Fund. Until 1963, there were different plans for
different classes of employees. That year, all public employee plans were
consolidated under URS. The system began offering DC plans to employees
in 1971, which were a precursor to what now are 457 plans that allow public
employees to supplement their retirement security with individual savings
accounts. In 1981, URS also began offering 401(k) plans for Utah public
employees in 1981 (URS 2007).
While the 2000–02 bear market hurt the funding level of many public
pension plans, the impacts were not quite so dramatic for URS. Its funded
status did decline, but the system was more than 90 percent funded despite
one of the most dramatic market fluctuations in history. This can be
attributed to the fact that URS did not increase benefits and continued
to make actuarially-required contributions during the 1990s bull market
(URS 2007).
Utah’s public employees’ pension fund has grown to more than $17
billion, or nearly double the size of the state’s annual budget, and it serves
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163,000 people including schoolteachers, judges, police officers, county
clerks, lawmakers, and ex-governors. According to the Salt Lake Tribune, it
is considered ‘an asset, the glossy polish on the state’s sparkling financial
rating’ and ‘rock solid, fully able to meet its obligations to retirees’ (Fahys
2007a).
Nonetheless, the Salt Lake Tribune reported that a DB switch measure was
triggered by ‘a conservative Legislature’ that was eager to ‘join a nationwide trend in business and government.’ ‘I feel quite comfortable with
the choice option,’ said Republican State Representative Merlynn Newbold
(Fahys 2007a).
On February 24, 2007, the Salt Lake Tribune reported that new employees
of the state Department of Information Technology (IT) Services would
choose between a traditional state pension and a 401(k)-style DC retirement plan under a bill passed by the Republican-controlled House. The
bill passed was a ‘stripped-down version’ of the original Dougall legislation intended to move all new hires to the DC system (Fahys 2007b).
Dougall fended off several efforts to kill the legislation, including one that
would have created a year-long study. The original measure eventually was
defeated, as was Dougall’s proposal to allow new transportation and IT hires
to choose which system to join (Fahys 2007b).
A cost estimate for implementing the measure suggested that state agencies might have to come up with as much as $18.4 million to deal with
the drain on the retirement fund (Fahys 2007b). An article reporting on
the failed measure drew attention to the fact that Republicans have tended
to be more supportive of personal retirement accounts than Democrats,
noting that the GOP controls the Utah legislature. The article reported
that critics of the bill argued that switching state employees from a DB to
a DC plan ‘would create the unintended actuarial consequence of starving
the DB plan of contributions’ (Defined Contribution & Savings Plan Alert
2007).
To summarize recent activities in the states, interest groups have had
a significant impact on the debate over state and local retirement plans
in recent years. Because of the long-term nature of retirement plans, the
ultimate effects of some of these efforts will not be fully felt for decades. It
appears that interest groups’ pursuit of their ideological goals are a major
reason why proposals to dismantle DBs have risen to the forefront in some
states, as evidenced in their broad statements and actions in states such
Alaska, California, and Colorado. It also appears that in recent years, these
interest groups saw an opportunity to gain traction on the issue in light
of rising contribution requirements to public plans that were the result of
the 2000–2002 bear market. Interestingly, there did not appear to be active
interest group involvement in the Utah debate where the funding and
contribution levels did not spike during the bear market. Although interest
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groups managed to create an audience for their positions with politicians
who were ideologically aligned, their rather mixed record in passing legislation to effect a switch from DB to DC suggests that these interest groups may
be talking past the public voters and unaligned legislators of either party.

Conclusion
This chapter has explored how public perceptions, political dynamics, and
interest groups are shaping the US public pension debate and policymaking. Public pensions have been a successful, shared enterprise between
public employees and taxpayers. They have successfully met employees’
needs for a secure source of retirement income that is adequate to maintain
a middle-class standard of living. At the same time, they have collectively
met the test of fiscal responsibility expected by the tax-paying public.
Challenges to public sector DBs do not appear to stem mainly from
economic considerations, nor public dissatisfaction. Rather, the public has
a low knowledge base and is undecided on the issue. But, where individuals
do have a viewpoint, it is often driven by ideological or political beliefs.
There does not appear to be a groundswell of discontent on the issue
of public pension and no demand rising up from ordinary citizens for
wholesale changes. Instead, efforts to dismantle public pensions have been
tied to partisan politics and organized ideological interest groups. Specifically, while prior research suggests that Republican party control is a strong
predictor of whether a state makes the switch from a DB to a DC plan, we
find that individual Republican voters are no more likely than Democrat
or Independent voters to support such a switch, after controlling for other
factors, including an ideological predisposition to individualism.
These findings may help to explain the patterns we observe in the states
examined. That is, the switch from DB to DC has not been a response to
demands from the electorate, nor a response to economic factors. Rather,
partisan politics and ideologically motivated interest groups have been a
primary driver behind efforts to dismantle public sector DB pension plans.

Notes
1

2

VanDerhei (2006) notes that a commonly-used rule of thumb dictates that
retirees should seek to replace 75–90 percent of their pre-retirement income
to maintain their living standards in retirement.
Although most state and local employees have DB plans, it is important to note
that 14 percent of state and local employees must rely on a DC plan alone
(Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto 2007).
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3

4

DC plan sponsors could come close to approximating these economies by offering annuity distribution options. In practice, however, most DC plans do not offer
annuities (Perun 2007).
Based on cross-tabulations of the data from Hart Research Associates
(2005, 2006).
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